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IN T'HE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HELEN T. JOHNSON,
)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (
vs.

I

No.

11110

DONALD J. JOHNSON,
)
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The Appeal in this case pertains to a Decree of
Divorce made and entered by the District Court of
Salt Lake County.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On September 21, 1967, in a default divorce hearing at which the defendant was not present but which
1

was held pur.suant to stipulation, the District Court
granted plaintiff a divorce. It also awarded her thr
alimony, child support, and personal property which
the parties had agreed upon in a formalized "Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement" betweeu
them. (R 44-54) At a "continuation" hearing on
October 6, 1967, initiated by plaintiff, the District
Court, over the objection of defendant, awarded plaintiff a 25% interest in some real property which was
not included in the formalized "Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement" but which had been conveyed to defendant by his parents subsequent thereto
and just eight days prior to the original default hearing
on the divorce (R 55-72).
Subsequently, on November 28, 1967, the District
Court signed the Decree of Divorce and denied defendant's Motion in the alternative to:
( 1) Base its "Findings", "Conclusions" and "Decree" solely on the "Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement"; or
( 2) Grant a new hearing and trial so that all

matters concerning both the "properties" and "obliga·
tions" of defendant may be considered and that all facts
concerning the need for child support and alimony and
the ability of defendant to pay said child support and
alimony may be considered.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The relief sought in this Appeal is either a modification of the Divorce Decree so as to eliminate therefrom the real property which the District Court
awarded plaintiff which had been conveyed to defendant by his parents just eight days before the default
hearing on the divorce, or, a new trial in which all the
facts and circumstances bearing on a fair, just and
equitable award of alimony and child support as well
as a division of property between the parties can be
heard and determined.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff filed her Complaint for a divorce from
defendant on February 1, 1967, (R 1) to which defeudant filed an answer on February 9, 1967, (R 5)
and a subsequent Answer on March 6, 1967.
Recognizing that their marital differences were
irreconcilable the parties thereafter ,stipulated to a
default hearing on the divorce and also agreed upon
what alimony, child support, and property might be
awarded plaintiff. This agreement was reduced to writing in a formalized "Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement". (R 20-21)
Pursuant to the stipulation between them the
dirorce was heard by the Honorable D. F. Wilkins,
District Judge, as a defa ult divorce on September 21,
HH\7. (R 44-54)
At that hearing Judge Wilkins
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granted plaintiff a divorce. He also awarded her the
alimony, child support, and personal property which
the parties had agreed might be awarded her in the
formalized "Stipulation and Property Settlement
Agreement" between them.
After the original hearing on the divorce, plaintiff
initiated and secured a "continuation" hearing which
was held on October 6, 1967. Her sole purpose for this
so-called "continuation" hearing was to have the Court
award her, besides the alimony, child support and per·
sonal property which it had already awarded her
pursuant to the "Stipulation and Property Settlement
Agreement", an interest in the real property which
defendant's parents had conveyed to him just eight days
before the original default divorce hearing. (R 54-72)
Plaintiff was successful in her endeavors. In spite
of defendant's objections, the District Court on November 28, 1967, signed the "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" and the "Decree". By this Divorce
Decree the District Court awarded plaintiff alimony,
child support and personal property based solely on
the "Stipulation and. Property Settlement Agreement",
and, in addition thereto, a 25% interest in real property
which defendant's parents had conveyed to him. Other
than what the parties stipulated to, there was never
any hearing relative to plaintiff's needs for alimony
and child support and what would be a fair and equitable division of the property between them, or hearing
relative to defendant's ability to pay alimony and child
support.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY MAKING AN AW ARD OF ALIMONY, CHILD SUPPORT, AND A DIVISION
OF PROPERTY CONTRARY TO THE STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES WITHOUT
HEARING AND CONSIDERING ALL THE
APP L I CA B L E FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES.
In a divorce proceeding the District Court may
make such orders as are equitable with reference to
alimony, child support, and a division of property
between the parties. This inherent authority is expressly
conferred upon the Court by the provisions of 30-3-5
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides in part as
follows:

"\Vhen a decree of divorce is made the Court
may make such orders in relation to the children,
property and parties, and the maintenance of the
parties and children, as may be equitable; ... "

In exercising such authority it is unquestioned
that the court is not bound by the stipulation of the
parties. See in this connection Madsen vs. Madsen,
2 U. (2d) 423, 276 P (2d) 917, Callister vs. Callister,
I U (2d) 34, 261 P (2d) 944. The stipulation of the
parties serves only as a recommendation. It is respectfully submitted, however, that if the court does not
~ee fit to go along with the recommendation of the
parties as set forth in their stipulation, the court should
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hear and consider all applicable facts and circumstances.
This was not done in the subject case.
The divorce started out as a contested case. Later
the parties stipulated it could be heard as a defaul;
case. They also stipulated as to alimony, child support,
and a property division. (R 21-22) It was in fact heard
as a default divorce on September 21, 1967. At that
hearing the court granted plaintiff a divorce. It also
accepted the recommendation of the parties and awarded plaintiff the alimony, child support and property
agreed upon and as was set forth in the formalized
"Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement''.
(R 44 54).
Before the Findings, Conclusions and Decree were
signed, however, in an unorthodox maneuver not provided for by the Statutes or Rules of Civil Procedure,
plaintiff's attorney got the Court to have what he
designated as a "continuation" hearing on October 6,
1967. The language of plaintiff's counsel as set forth
in the record at Page 56 is immuminating:
MR. HAYNIE: May the record show that
this is a continuation called at the request of
plaintiff of a hearing heretofore held prior to
determination of this matter for the purpose of
introducing certain evidence and for the purpose
of ex-mining findings by the Court prior to
filing of the findings which have not yet beeu
filed.
'Vhen the Court queried counsel further as to the exact
nature of this so-called "continuation" hearing he re·
plied: (R 58)
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MR. HAYNIE: All right. The amendment
which we would like to have made is to permit
the stipulation to be set aside and to be amendso as to make provision for the disposition of
real estate which was in the hands of the defendant and undisclosed to the plaintiff at the time
of that stipulation.
Plaintiff's counsel deviously tried to create the
impression that defendant had misled everyone, including the Court, as to the property which he owned at
the time of the stipulation. He stated to the Court:
(R 60)

MR. HAYNIE : If the Court, please, we took
the deposition of the defendant. He said he had
no real property. We had a prior hearing before
Judge Anderson and he said there was no property. She testified she entered into this stipulation that there was no property. We want the
evidence introduced and the Court to determine
whether or not she has an interest.

All of the aforesaid facts are true. Defendant did not
own any real property at the time his deposition was
taken. He did not own any real property at the pl'.ior
hearing before Judge Anderson. He did not own any
rea I property when he and plaintiff entered intq the
stipulation between them. The stipulation was actually
entered into prior to September 13, 1967. True, it was
not signed until later, but, the parties had entered into
the st ipulation before the 13th of September. Defendant did not own any real property until after the
stipulation was entered into, namely, until September
n, 1967. It was then that defendant's parents con-
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veyed their interest in their home to him subject 10
a life estate which they reserved unto themselves.
Admittedly, the Court has wide latitude and dis.
cretion in determining the proper disposition of prop.
erty in a divorce proceeding. See in this connectio11
Wilson vs. Wilson, 296 P (2d) 977, 5 U (2d) 79,
Blackham vs. Blackham, 230 P ( 2d) 566, 119 U 593,
Tresnayne vs Tresnayne, 211 P ( 2d) 452, 116 U 483,
Anderson vs. Anderson, 138 P ( 2d) 252, 104 U 104,
Bullen vs. Bullen, 262 P 292, 71 U 63 and Pinney
vs. Pinney, 245 P 329, 66 U 612. However, as enunci·
ated in the above cases, all of the facts and circumstanc~i
should be considered.
In this case defendant did not own any real property
when the stipulation was entered into. He acquired
some real property from his parents after he and hii
wife had entered into a property settlement agreement.
Plaintiff and defendant had not been living together
for more than five years. (R 48) Defendant's parents
were 81 and 76 respectively. (R 66). It was not until,
after plaintiff and defendant had entered into their
property settlement agreement that they conveyed the
real property in question to defendant.
To make an award of alimony, child support and
property based partly on a stipulation and partly ou
testimony concerning only one isolated property trans·
action without considering all the facts and circum·
stances and without giving defendant an opportunity
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to be heard on all these matters is a denial of due
process and an abuse of discretion.

POINT II. SINCE THE COURT REJECTED
THE PARTIES' STIPULATION WITH REFERENCE TO THE DISPOSITION OF THEIR
PROPERTY IT SHOULD NOT HAVE
A'\T ARDED PLAINTIFF ALIMONY BASED
THEREON.
The divorce was a default divorce and accordingly
the Court did not hear and consider any evidence concerning the need of plaintiff for alimony or the ability
of defendant to pay alimony. It based its award 0£
alimony to plaintiff solely on the stipulation of the
parties while at the same time it rejected the stipulation
of the parties with reference to the disposition of their
property.
Defendant is and has been a real estate salesman
For the past two years his total gross earnings were
only approximately $425.00 per month. Plaintiff was
and is gainfully employed and her admitted gross earnings approximate $300.00 per month. Merely because
defendant stipulated that plaintiff might be awarded
$80.00 per month alimony does not mean that the facts
justify such an award or that she needs that amount
or that defendant can pay that amount.
The Court should either have accepted the stipulation of the parties concerning alimony, child support,
and the disposition of the property of the parties or
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it should have rejected the entire stipulation and
received and considered evidence concerning all sucn
1
matters, and entered its Decree based on such evidence. 1
To reject defendant's attempt to submit such evidence 1
for consideration was an abuse of its discretion.
I

CONCLUSION

I

I

For the reasons set forth herein, and, based on
the evidence in the record and the law applicable there· 1
to, Defendant-Appellant should be granted a new trial
or the Divorce Decree modified so as to exclude there·
from the real property interest which the District Court
awarded Plaintiff-Respondent.
Respectfully submitted,

QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON
Attorney for DefendantAppellant
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Received copies of the fore going this ............ day
of February, 1968.
Louis M. Haynie
Attomey for Plaintift'.
Respondent

